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United National Movement (Georgia)

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United National Movement
ერთიანი ნაციონალური მოძრაობა
ChairmanTinatin Bokuchava
Honorary ChairmanMikheil Saakashvili
Leader of Women's WingTinatin Bokuchava
Political SecretaryPetre Tsiskarishvili
Founder
FoundedOctober 2001 (2001-10)
Split fromUnion of Citizens
HeadquartersTbilisi
Ideology
Political positionCentre-right
National affiliation
European affiliationEuropean People's Party (affiliate)[2]
International affiliationInternational Democracy Union
Colors  Red and   White
  Maroon (customary)
Seats In Parliament
15 / 150
Municipal Councilors
441 / 2,068
Seats In Supreme Council of Adjara
7 / 21
Seats In Tbilisi City Assembly
10 / 50
Seats In Kutaisi City Assembly
5 / 35
Seats In Batumi City Assembly
7 / 35
Seats In Rustavi City Assembly
11 / 35
Municipal Mayors
1 / 64
Website
unm.ge

United National Movement (Georgian: ერთიანი ნაციონალური მოძრაობა, romanized: ertiani natsionaluri modzraoba; UNM) also colloquially known as the Natsebi[a] is a pro-Western liberal-conservative political party in Georgia founded by Mikheil Saakashvili, which rose to power following the Rose Revolution.

The party was established in 2001 by Mikheil Saakashvili, who separated from the then ruling Union of Citizens of president Eduard Shevardnadze, and came to power after challenging the incumbents in the 2003 parliamentary election and the subsequent Rose Revolution. UNM followed a pro-Western course with neoliberal economic policies and cultural liberalism. It rule has been frequently characterized as autocratic.[3][4][5][6] The party lost the 2012 parliamentary election to Georgian Dream, following the Gldani prison scandal confirming the widespread and systematic torture in Georgian prisons under Saakashvili's rule.[7] Since then, it has been the main opposition party.

History

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Early years

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Foundation

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The founder of United National Movement Mikheil Saakashvili.

Mikheil Saakashvili, the founder of United National Movement (UNM), had his start in the political party Union of Citizens of Georgia (UCG) of the president Eduard Shevardnadze. He was elected to the parliament in 1995 soon joining the team of so-called "young reformers" within the party led by Zurab Zhvania.[8]

Opposition

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By the late 90s, a rift was also growing between the "young reformers" and the establishment factions in CUG. The division was intensified following the 2000 presidential election. Saakashvili, who at the same time had server as the country’s justice minister, left CUG and established the opposition National Movement party, the predecessor to UNM. Zhvania, along with another prominent member of the "young reformers" team Nino Burjanadze also split in 2002 creating the United Democrats party.[8]

At the same time, the government’s popularity drastically decreased being attributed to its inability to exert territorial control over the country, weak economic growth, and lack of development of public infrastructure. The 2002 local elections marked a turning point for CUG where it achieved a crushing defeat getting less than 2% in Tbilisi Sakrebulo. National Movement led by Saakashvili got a quarter of the votes in the election with him being elected the chairman of the Sakrebulo.[8]

Despite the elections held under CUG’s rule being generally viewed as fraudulent, the scale of fraud was described as not being enough to change the outcome of an election. This changed in 2003 parliamentary election which was widely viewed as fraudulent. Parallel voting tabulations had showed an overwhelming opposition victory despite the official results claiming otherwise.[8][9] In the official results, National Movement achieved 18,74% of the vote winning 42 seats.

Rose Revolution

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Main article: Rose Revolution
The Rose Revolution.

National Movement and Burjanadze-Democrats organized mass rallies in protest of the official results demanding the government either recognize the opposition's victory or resign. Some other significant opposition forces such as Labour Party and New Rights Party chose to abstain from the protests. The opposition and the government faced off on the first session of the new parliament forcing MPs and Shevardnadze, who was delivering a speech, to leave the room. The following day, Shevardnadze made the decision to resign as president making Burjanadze, the speaker of the parliament, the new interim president. Days later, the Georgian Supreme Court declared the results as invalid. This event was later known as the Rose Revolution.[8]

Saakashvili emerged as the clear leader from the protests, with him winning an overwhelming victory in the snap 2004 presidential election, where he ran virtually uncontested. National Movement and United Democrats later merged with them forming United National Movement. The party went on to win 66.24% in the 2004 parliamentary election.[8]

First term (2004-2008)

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Government reforms

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Inaguration of President Mikheil Saakashvili.

Reforming a weak and corrupt state was a central goal of the Rose Revolution government. The salaries given out to state employees were so low, that based on the wages an employee could not theoretically survive. This led to government officials having to take bribes and engage in other corrupt practices to sustain themselves. In 2004, UNM introduced the Reform and Development Fund which raised salaries to several thousand top officials with it being funded by international donors and Georgian businesses. Salary increases were later expanded to law and military officials. This attracted a number of qualified young people to work for the government when previously they would be relegated to working abroad or for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).[8]

Another way UNM tried to fight corruption was through the prosecution of former major government officials for it. The officials would have to pay a large fine covering for the embezzled sums of money after which they would be let go. Most of those arrests were made in early 2004 after which the government focused on middle-level officials. This process, however, was widely criticized by international organizations, including the Council of Europe, for giving the prosecution too much arbitrary power and not following due process.[8]

Other ways of fighting corruption included disbanding the Traffic Police, which was widely known as one of the most corrupt institutions in Georgia, and replacing it with the new Patrol Police, which enjoyed significantly more popularity. Additionally, standardized exams were introduced with them being the only way to be admitted to the Universities. The old system had been notoriously corrupt with people often being accepted based on bribes. The new system has been widely recognized as fair. In aspects where the government felt it did not have the resources to reform the corrupt institutions, it had to controversially scrap them with the likes of mandatory inspection of cars being suspended. The government further cracked down on organized crime, with it in 2005 criminalizing belonging to a criminal organization.[8]

Another achievement of the UNM government would be its more efficient tax-collecting policy. Previously, the "shadow economy" accounted for 70% of the economy with the government only collecting 10% of the GDP in public revenue, the lowest in the post-Soviet states. The bigger budget allowed the government to finance spending on road repairs, repainting the façades of buildings, and the reintroduction of free medical emergency services.[8]

Zurab Zhvania, the first Prime Minister under the new constitution.

UNM also implemented government reforms establishing the role of the Prime Minister and giving the President the ability to dissolve the parliament. The role of the presidency was substantially increased with the system being sometimes referred to as "super-presidential". Its supporters argued that a stronger presidency was needed to more effectively push for reforms, while its critics denounced the concentration of power. Additionally, some international organizations such as the Council of Europe were critical of the reforms and pushed for the parliament to be given equal weight to the presidency.[8]

Some progress was made in the area of democracy and human rights, although, critics highlighted systematic issues carried over from Shevardnadze’s administration. The 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections were described by OSCE-ODIHR as "the most democratic since independence". In 2005, UNM passed reforms on local governance designating Rayon (district) as the singular level of local governance. However, some criticized the reforms as insufficient and as "not leaving local governments enough resources to create viable institutions". The same year, UNM decriminalized defamation, making it harder to sue journalists for critical coverage. Additionally, violence against minorities was curtailed.[8]

However, during UNM’s tenure media freedom was often criticized. In January 2005, the Council of Europe designated the country as being subject to "self-censored media" with it in 2006 noting that the "media is financially weak and still lacks the democratic culture which would allow it to credibly perform their role of a democratic watchdog". Some additionally alleged that opposition voices were taken off the air due to government pressure. However, others saw the media legislation as being liberal and Georgian media being free to criticize the government and host its opponents.[8]

Economic and social reforms

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Kakha Bendukidze, the Minister of Economic reforms from 2004 to 2008.

The new government pursued economically liberal policies. Under the Shevardnadze government, Georgia already pursued free market percepts recommended by the International Monetary Fund, however, the Saakashvili administration restarted the massive privatization and accelerated all those policies. In 2004, Kakha Bendukidze, a Russian-based Georgian businessman and prominent free market advocate, was appointed by Saakashvili as a Minister of Economics. In 2004, Bendukidze notoriously said he would "sell everything but Georgia’s conscience" with his goal being closing down his own ministry and demolishing all economic regulation by the state.[10]

Bendukidze implemented radical tax system reforms. Under him, a flat 12% tax rate was introduced with the overall number of taxes being reduced from 21 taxes to 6. Additionally, rapid privatization of state assets was implemented, and Georgia's economy was opened to foreign investment and global markets with few restrictions or regulations. Supporters of Bendukidze praise the rapid economic growth and business-friendly environment that was created due to his reforms, while his detractors point out unequal distribution of that growth among the population.[10][11][12]

The Saakashvili administration pushed liberal social policy reforms, which put it in discord with the conservative values of the Georgian population.[13] In 2005, the parliament took steps to take religion out of public education, passing the General Education Act, that restricted the teaching of religion in schools and the use of religious symbols in the school space for devotional purposes.[14][15]

Territorial disputes

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Aslan Abashidze, the leader of Adjara from 1991 to 2004.

One of the main goals of the Rose Revolution government was restoring territorial control. Adjara, which at the time was led by the autocratic Aslan Abashidze government often defied the central Tbilisi authorities, however, unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Abashidze did not desire full independence. In 2004, Abashidze was forced to flee after a series of mass public demonstrations, with Adjara returning to Tbilisi control. This was viewed as a major success for the government led by UNM.[8]

Eduard Kokoity, De facto president of Georgia's breakaway territory South Ossetia from 2001 to 2011.

Encouraged by the developments in Adjara, the Rose Revolution government sought to bring South Ossetia into Georgian control. Georgia and South Ossetia at the time were actively trading with each other and the people could move between the territories freely. A large part of this trade took place through the borderline Ergneti market, with it being a black market where illegal activities and smuggling had occurred. UNM believed that, as in Adjara, the crux of the problem was the defiant separatist government and that the Ossetian people would soon rise up with the help of the Georgian state to topple it. Tbilisi government closed the Ergneti market, enacted a so-called "humanitarian offensive" with the goal of winning over the South Ossetian people, and moved its military to the region in hopes of intimidating the Tskhinvali authorities.[8][16]

The move, however, backfired with the South Ossetians growing angry at Georgia and consolidating their separatist positions. Closing the Ergneti Black Market reduced corruption, however, it also made South Ossetia economically trapped. Additionally, military skirmishes ensued resulting in the loss of life. The UNM government decided to abandon its approach recognizing it as a mistake. In January 2005, the Georgian government presented its peace plan at OSCE conference held in Ljubljana garnering Russian support, a key player in the conflict. This was viewed as a surprise considering the Georgian and Russian authorities having been at odds over the issue. Despite this minor win, the South Ossetia situation was viewed as an overall setback for the Rose Revolution government.[8][16]

2007 protests

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Main article: 2007 Georgian demonstrations
Irakli Okruashvili, the former Defence Minister and the leader of the opposition Movement for United Georgia party.

While Saakashvili early on enjoyed personal popularity for his youth, vigor, and international profile, allegations of human rights abuses and authoritarianism started to create an opposition movement against him. Soon UNM started to experience defections with one of the most significant ones being Irakli Okruashvili, the Defense Minister, leaving in 2007 and founding the Movement for United Georgia party. Okruashvili made accusations that the military had fallen to widespread corruption and that Saakashvili wanted to kill opposition figure Badri Patarkatsishvili. Subsequently, this led to his arrest on extortion charges. He pled guilty, retracted the accusations, and was released on bail after which he left the country. The opposition claimed that he retracted the statements and admitted guilt based on threats and coercion.[17][18][19]

demonstration in Tbilisi on 7 November 2007.

In late 2007, The opposition subsequently organized protests with around 50,000 people gathering in front of the parliament building in Tbilisi on 2 November. The protests continued until November 7, calling for Saakashvili's resignation, when riot police was deployed dispersing the demonstration and the government enacted a 15-day nationwide state of emergency. The move received widespread criticism both locally and abroad and it was lifted the following week. Imedi TV, opposition-leaning media, was taken off air, and protestors demanded its return which took place a month later. Saakashvili called early elections, cutting his term by a year, and stepped down as president.[17][18] Burjanadze, the speaker of the parliament, became the acting president.[20]

2008 elections

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See also: 2008 Georgian presidential election and 2008 Georgian parliamentary election

Saakashvili was reelected in the 2008 presidential election held on 5 January narrowly winning over 50% and avoiding a second-round. 2008 parliamentary election were held on 21 May where UNM won a landslide victory getting 59.18% and once again being the single ruling party of the country. The opposition criticized the results as illegitimate with them boycotting the parliament, however, international observers largely deemed the results free and fair noting only isolated procedural violations and instances of fraud.[17][18][21]

Second term (2008-2012)

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August War

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Main article: Russo-Georgian War
Map of the Georgian and Russian military offensive

2008 saw the deterioration of relations between Russia and Georgia reaching a full diplomatic crisis by April 2008. The crisis soon evolved into a war, first between Georgia and the Russian-backed South Ossetian separatists and later directly with Russia. On 1 August 2008, the South Ossetian forces started shelling Georgian villages, with Georgia sending its army units into the conflict zone on 7 August. The Georgian army managed to quickly take control of Tskhinvali.[27][31]

Woman crying for help during the Russian bombing of Gori

Russia soon falsely accused the Georgian side of committing a genocide and launched a full-scale land, air, and sea invasion of Georgia, including its undisputed territory on 8 August.[32][33] Additionally, reports exist of some Russian troops illicitly crossing the Georgia–Russia border through the Roki Tunnel before the conflict broke out.[39] Russian and separatist forces fought Georgian troops in and around South Ossetia for several days, until Georgian forces retreated.[40] Russian and Abkhaz forces opened a second front by attacking the Kodori Gorge held by Georgia, while Russian naval forces blockaded part of the Georgian Black Sea coastline.[41] Nicolas Sarkozy, the President of France, personally negotiated a ceasefire agreement on 12 August.[42][43]

Russian forces temporarily occupied the Georgian cities of Zugdidi, Senaki, Poti and Gori.[49] Russia recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia on 26 August and the Georgian government severed diplomatic relations with Russia.[50][51] Georgia additionally withdrew from Commonwealth of Independent States, a Russia dominated international organization of post-Soviet states, and called for others to do so as well.[17] Russia mostly completed its withdrawal of troops from undisputed parts of Georgia on 8 October.[52] The South Ossetians destroyed most ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia and were responsible for an ethnic cleansing of Georgians.[60] The war displaced 192,000 people.[61] While many returned to their homes after the war, 20,272 people, mostly ethnic Georgians, remained displaced as of 2014.[62]

Further protests and dissent

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demonstration in Tbilisi on 10 April 2009.

The opposition heavily criticized Saakashvili’s handling of the war and accused him of dragging Georgia into a war it could not win.[17][18] UNM suffered several defections, with Nino Burjanadze leaving the position of the speaker of the parliament and founding the opposition Democratic Movement–United Georgia party. In December 2008, the party suffered another defection with the former Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli setting up the Movement for a Fair Georgia party. Both of the defectors criticized Saakashvili’s policies pledging a "wiser approach" to Russia.[citation needed] In April 2009, the opposition launched daily protests calling for Saakashvili’s resignation. Even though the protests died down by the end of spring, political tensions remained and the opposition held further protests towards the end of 2009. As a result of the protests, the government decided to hold early local elections in May 2010.[17][18] UNM won the elections decisively getting 65.75% of the vote.

On 21 May 2011 over 10,000 people protested against Saakashvili's government in Tbilisi and Batumi. Nino Burjanadze and her husband Badri Bitsadze emerged as the lead figures. Protesters tried to prevent a parade commemorating Georgian Independence Day. Georgian police suppressed the demonstrations with tear gas and rubber bullets. Saakashvili accused the protesters of attempting to orchestrate a government takeover using paramilitary groups.[citation needed]

2012 parliamentary election

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See also: 2012 Georgian parliamentary election
Mikheil Saakashvili and Bidzina Ivanishvili in 2012

The public discontent over Saakashvili's presidency was high, but no opposition party managed to unite the population around its platform. This situation changed in late 2011 when Bidzina Ivanishvili, an oligarch primarily known for charity work and contributions to public projects, decided to step out of the shadow and lead the political opposition against Saakashvili by uniting the opposition and mobilizing popular support.[63]

Ivanishvili first launched Georgian Dream in December 2011 as a movement and staged several mass demonstrations.[citation needed] On 21 February 2012, Ivanishvili announced the formation of a coalition of the same name, together with established political parties such as Republicans, Our Georgia – Free Democrats, and National Forum, pledging to increase welfare spending and to pursue a more pragmatic approach with Russia while maintaining a pro-Western and pro-NATO foreign policy.[64][65] In subsequent months, two other opposition parties joined the coalition - the Conservative Party and Industry Will Save Georgia.[66] Georgian Dream was transformed into a political party on 21 April 2012, being the leading party of the coalition.[67]

Georgian Dream held mass demonstrations around the country, with a rally held in downtown Tbilisi on 27 May 2012 having been attended by an estimated 80,000 people.[68] Georgian Dream's campaign surged after the Gldani prison scandal, which highlighted widespread torture in Georgian prisons under Saakashvili's administration.[17][69][70] In response to GD rallies that regularly attracted tens of thousands of people, the government responded by staging a rival mass event.[71][72]

The six-party Georgian Dream coalition led by Ivanishvili successfully challenged UNM in the 2012 parliamentary election.[73][74] It won 54.97% of the vote, while UNM received 40.34%, granting the coalition a majority of 85 seats in parliament. The remaining 65 seats went to UNM.[75] Saakashvili conceded the loss and pledged to support the constitutional process of forming a new government, while at the same time noting his deep opposition to the coalition.[76][77] This was the first democratic transfer of power in Georgia.[78]

First term in opposition (2012-2016)

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Vano Merabishvili charged on abuse of power, bribery of voters, and inefficient use of budget funds.

Soon after coming to power, the Georgian Dream coalition started persecuting UNM government officials with criminal charges ranging from embezzlement to abuse of power and torture. Former Prime Minister Vano Merabishvili, governor of Kakheti Zurab Tchiaberashvili, and Head of the Penitentiary Department Bacho Akhalaia were among the ones who were arrested. Overall more than 20,000 complaints were filed by citizens and inmates with the Prosecutor's Office in connection to the past administration, including 4,000 cases of alleged torture or ill-treatment. In total thirty-five people were persecuted.[17][79] With its reputation being tarnished, widespread calls were made by the public to ban the party altogether. The Georgian Dream coalition itself was divided over the issue with some factions supporting the move, while others such as the new chairman of parliament Davit Usupashvili preferring to persecute only specific individuals suspected of crimes.[80]

UNM emerged as the singular opposition party in the new parliament. During this time, Georgian politics shifted towards a two-party system and was marked by a confrontation between Georgian Dream and United National Movement. This confrontation shaped the identity of the two parties, with UNM becoming a party for the people disillusioned with the Georgian Dream government, while Georgian Dream became a front for those who featured UNM's return to power. UNM began to build its identity on being the sole party capable of challenging Georgian Dream.[citation needed]

David Bakradze, UNM's nominee for the 2013 presidential election.

In 2013 presidential election, United National Movement suffered a landslide defeat at the hands of Georgian Dream with its candidates Giorgi Margvelashvili attaining 62.12%, while the UNM candidate David Bakradze managed to only score 21.72%.[81] Shortly after the election, Saakashvili left Georgia due to fears he would be persecuted as well.[17][82] In 2014, the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia filed criminal charges against Saakashvili. In 2018, the Tbilisi City Court sentenced him in absentia to six years in prison for ordering the beating of Valeri Gelashvili and pardoning in prior agreement the individuals tried for Sandro Girgvliani's murder.[83] Saakashvili continued to manage his party from abroad while accusing the Georgian government of using the legal system as a tool of political retribution.

On 5 November 2014, Free Democrats announced their withdrawal from Georgian Dream coalition which led to the government losing its majority.[84] However, by 10 November, 12 independent majoritarian MPs, initially elected under UNM but later quitting the party following its defeat, joined the Georgian Dream coalition, which led to its number of MPs increasing to 87 in the parliament. Thus, as a result of the crisis, Georgian Dream managed to increase its representation in the parliament by four seats. Analysts saw this as unsurprising as those independent MPs were frequently voting along with the Georgian Dream coalition, despite not being official members.[85]

Despite recruiting some new and young new and young people like Zaza Bibilashvili and Zurab Japaridze, UNM remained loyal to Saakashvili and continued to be seen as the party of the ex-president. This caused significant rifts within the party as many members thought that UNM had to break with its past to mount serious opposition to Georgian Dream.[citation needed] New Political Center — Girchi, led by Japaridze, was the first to break with the party doing so in May 2015, followed by New Georgia, led by Giorgi Vashadze, in May 2016. Both of the parties later joined State for the People bloc for the 2016 parliamentary election.[86][87]

Second term in opposition (2016-2020)

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European Georgia split

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See also: European Georgia

Soon after the election, where UNM received 27.11% of the proportional vote, it experienced a major party split on 12 January 2017, as a result of a conflict between Davit Bakradze, Giga Bokeria, former mayor of Tbilisi Gigi Ugulava along with their supporters, and members of the party loyal to Saakashvili. Saakashvili had rejected the party's decision to enter parliament after the 2016 election, calling for a boycott, and had further opposed the initiative of party members to appoint a new chairman in his place. A majority of the UNM's elected MPs (21 out of 27) defected to European Georgia (EG), leaving UNM with only six MPs in the parliament.[citation needed] In the 2017 local elections, UNM saw a reduction in its vote share, falling to 17.08%, however, it remained the largest opposition party. The party was heavily affected by the formation of EG, which garnered 10.4% of the vote.

Grigol Vashadze UNM's nominee for the 2018 presidential election and its chairman from 2019 to 2020.

2018 presidential election

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Main article: 2018 Georgian presidential election

Ahead of the 2018 presidential election, UNM formed the Strength is in Unity coalition with it nominating Grigol Vashadze as the joint presidential candidate.[88] The alliance included UNM as well as eight other parties including For a New Georgia, Serve Georgia, the National Democratic Party, the Christian Conservative Party, the Civil Alliance for Freedom, New Georgia, Georgia Among Leaders, and the European Democrats.[89]

The presidential election was seen as an opportunity for UNM to achieve its first victory since its loss of power. It was nearly successful in defeating the Georgian Dream-backed independent candidate Salome Zurabishvili in the first round with Vashadze getting 37.74% of the vote compared to Zourabichvili's 40.48%. After a stronger-than-expected performance from opposition, Ivanishvili put together a scheme in which the debts of 600,000 Georgians would be written off and covered by his charity, in an attempt to secure Zourabichvili's victory. It was considered "an unprecedented case of vote-bribing".[90] The government supported scheme was enough to boost Georgian Dream's popularity and give Zourabichvili a victory in the second round.[91] On 24 March 2019, Saakashvili stepped down as the party chairman, with him being succeeded by Vashadze. Nevertheless, Saakashvili remained the most influential figure in the party.[92]

Gavrilov's Night

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Main article: 2019 protests in Georgia (country)
Sergei Gavrilov, a Russian lawmaker from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, in 2019.

The summer of 2019 set off a prolonged period of political unrest and civil discontent with Georgian Dream's rule. On 20 June 2019, Parliament of Georgia hosted the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy, an organization set up by the Greek parliament to unite Orthodox Christian lawmakers worldwide. With both Russia and Georgia being members of the organization, the Russian delegation arrived to take part in the session in the Georgian parliament. The session was opened with a speech from Sergei Gavrilov, a Russian lawmaker from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, whilst sitting in the chair of the Head of Parliament.[93]

Day 2 of the Gavrilov's Night protests.

The opposition said it was a denigration of Georgian sovereignty and completely unacceptable that Gavrilov presided over a session in Georgian parliament, as a representative of the occupying power with a history of casting anti-Georgia votes. The opposition, including UNM, called for protests in front of the parliament building.[94] That same day, a large protest took place in front of Parliament, which was violently dispersed by the orders of Interior Minister Giorgi Gakharia. It became known as Gavrilov's Night. Georgian Dream leader Ivanishvili said the protest was legitimate, but the situation was exploited by the opposition parties to storm the parliament building, thus the police measures were necessary to prevent a coup.[95] The protests continued for months, demanding electoral reforms, snap elections, and resignations from the ruling party. Despite some concessions from Georgian Dream, such as the resignation of the chairman of parliament and the partial electoral amendments, the protests did not stop.[96][97][98]

2020 parliamentary election

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Main article: 2019 protests in Georgia (country)
Giorgi Vashadze, Strength is in Unity coalition's initial pick for PM candidate.

By 8 March 2020, Strength is in Unity coalition had seen an exodus of parties with only five remaining: UNM, New Georgia, Law and Justice, the European Democrats, and the Christian Conservative Party.[citation needed] The alliance experienced its largest setback in July 2020 after the group rejected the prime ministerial candidacy of Giorgi Vashadze.[99] Vashadze's New Georgia and Tako Charkviani's Law and Justice both left to form their own electoral bloc, Strategy Aghmashenebeli.[100]

The Strength is in Unity bloc continuously polled higher than any other opposition group and other parties sought a certain level of cooperation to avoid competition. In August, 30 opposition parties, including the SIU members, signed an agreement to field joint candidates in the various majoritarian districts of Tbilisi, although SIU would break the agreement by nominating Khatia Dekanoidze to run in the Isani Majoritarian District, where other parties had already nominated Giorgi Vashadze. Meanwhile, SIU's other nominees in Tbilisi (Nika Melia in Gldani and Levan Khabeishvili in Samgori) were endorsed by the 30-party group.[citation needed]

On September 7, Strength Is in Unity nominated former President Mikheil Saakashvili as its nominee for Prime Minister of Georgia, a controversial choice as the UNM leader was at the time in exile in Ukraine and had been convicted in absentia by Georgian courts in 2018.[101] Nonetheless, five political parties (UNM, Progress and Freedom (PF), State for the People (SFP), and the Republican Party) came together on September 15 and signed an agreement to formally recreate the SIU coalition. The coalition's electoral list was led by singer Vakhtang Kikabidze.[102] Out of 30 majoritarian districts, four SIU nominees were members of Progress and Freedom, while the other 26 were members of UNM.[103]

Third term in opposition (2020-2024)

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Post-election political crisis

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Main article: 2020–2021 Georgian political crisis

Strength is in Unity won 27.1% in the parliamentary election, winning 36 seats in the national legislature and finishing second, behind Georgian Dream.[104] In 2020 Adjaran legislative election, which was held simultaneously, it won 34% and was the only opposition group to win seats in the autonomous republic's legislature.[105] However, SIU joined other political parties in refusing to recognize the electoral results after allegations of voter fraud surfaced, boycotting majoritarian runoffs and entering either the parliament or the Supreme Council of Adjara.[106] However, one of its elected members in Adjara from the Republican Party broke the boycott and entered the Supreme Council on December 25.[107]

In the aftermath of the election and the ensuing political crisis, the SIU backed negotiations with Georgian Dream facilitated by Western powers, along with European Georgia, Strategy Aghmashenebeli, Lelo for Georgia, Girchi-More Freedom, and the Labour Party.[108] While SIU MPs formally renounced their mandates, Parliament formally rejected their suspension on February 2, which allowed for negotiations to continue.[109] The crisis worsened when authorities arrested UNM chairman and the de facto leader of the coalition Nika Melia on February 28. On March 1, 2021, EU Council President Charles Michel launched new negotiations between Georgian Dream and the opposition to put an end to the political crisis with SIU being represented by Salome Samadashvili and Akaki Minashvili from UNM and Khatuna Samnidze from the Republican Party.[110] The sides reached an agreement on April 19, although SIU refused to sign the deal. This refusal proved to be controversial in the coalition with it leading to the Republican Party leaving Strength is in Unity, along with Grigol Vashadze and Salome Samadashvili, who each signed the agreement independently.[111]

2021 local elections

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Main article: 2021 Georgian local elections

The tensions between the ruling Georgian Dream-Democratic Georgia party and the opposition United National Movement (UNM) culminated in the arrest of ex-president and ex-UNM leader, Mikheil Saakashvili. Former President Saakashvili claimed to have returned to Georgia prior to the 2021 local elections after an eight-year exile, and called on his followers to march on the capital, Tbilisi. The Georgian police, however, claimed that Saakashvili was not in Georgia. He was arrested later on 1 October 2021. The MIA stated that Saakashvili had illegally crossed the border and was hiding in the flat in Tbilisi. He was transferred to the prison in Rustavi. On October 14, tens of thousands of Georgians have rallied in Tbilisi to demand the release of Mikheil Saakashvili.[112] It was claimed that Saakashvili returned to Georgia to influence the results of the local elections. However, the United National Movement failed to defeat the Georgian Dream, finishing second with 30.67% of the vote.

2024 parliamentary election

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In January 2023, Levan Khabeishvili was elected as Chairman of the United National Movement, defeating his predecessor Nika Melia.

Ideology

[edit]
A pro-NATO sign edited by UNM, the then-ruling party of Georgia.

Originally a center-left party, the UNM moved its position to center-right[113] since the Rose Revolution and combines political, economic and cultural liberalism with cultural and civic nationalism. Its main political priorities include fighting corruption and crime, strengthening law and order, improving social services to the poor and reducing administrative barriers for doing business. It supports small government, deregulation of the economy, privatization, free market and policies of economic liberalism. The party advocates attracting foreign direct investments through business-friendly environment, low tax rates, abolition of capital control, and political stability with a goal of stimulating high economic growth in a short time frame. The UNM also supports increasing of government spendings in the social protection, education, military and infrastructure. Its economic model strongly resembles that of Four Asian Tigers. The government of the National Movement has been characterized as "perhaps the freest market government in the world" drawing influence from the theories of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, and policies of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US.[114]

The party has been varying on the topics of the social and cultural politics. Signing of the memorandum with the Tbilisi Pride on LGBT rights in May 2021 has cemented its status as a culturally liberal party.[115] Nevertheless, the party itself tries to avoid clear association with either cultural liberalism or conservatism and tries to garner support from both sides. For example, in 2019 Mikheil Saakashvili has stated that he was always in support of traditional Georgian values and blamed Giga Bokeria for devaluing the image of the National Movement in the eyes of the conservative public.[116] Giga Bokeria called this statement ridiculous, claiming that he was never in the position of power to make such decisions.

The National Movement supports a cultural form of nationalism, trying to reconcile it with culturally liberal values, resembling a national liberal party. Thus, it abandoned the traditionally ethnic-based form of Georgian nationalism, defining the nation in terms of culture and shared values instead of ethnicity and bloodline. The party's nationalist agenda encompasses ethnic minorities, including Abkhazians and Ossetians in respective breakaway republics, which are deemed as inseparable parts of Georgian nation like other minorities.

The UNM's foreign policy programme has a strong emphasis on Euro-Atlantic integration.[117] During the first years in government, the party has tried to reconcile with Russia on topics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with Mikheil Saakashvili visiting Vladimir Putin in Moscow numerous times to hold negotiations.[citation needed] Although its stance changed drastically since the 2008 war, when Russia was identified as the number one threat of Georgian national security. The party deems Russian actions against Georgia as imperialistic attempts to preserve its sphere of influence in the South Caucasus, blocking Georgian integration into the EU and NATO. Based on the close relationship with the United States, Mikheil Saakashvili elaborated his vision of Georgia as the "Israel of the Caucasus". Based on this concept, Saakashvili developed close ties with Israel under US auspices.[118]

The United National Movement presented itself as the "revolutionary movement" aimed to align Georgia with the "modern" and "civilized" Western world as opposed to Soviet and post-Soviet "backwardness". Saakashvili positioned himself as a radical Westernizer, and portrayed the West as the "civilized world". Saakashvili described Russia as a "backward" and "unmodern" state and positioned it as a chief ideological rival.[119] Saakashvili built his foreign policy on anti-Russian and pro-Western narrative and discredited any discussion on dealing with Russia by likening it to "supporting the enemy".[120]

The UNM has received public criticism for crackdown on peaceful protests in 2007 and 2011, police brutality, zero tolerance policy, torture of inmates in the prisons and cronyism. Some critics have characterized the UNM's rule as a "liberal autocracy".[4][6][5]

Electoral performance

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Parliamentary elections

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Election Leader Votes % Seats +/– Position Government
2003 Mikhail Saakashvili 345,197 18.1
42 / 235
 new 3rd Opposition
2004 Nino Burjanadze 1,027,070 67.0
135 / 150
 Increase 93 Increase 1st Government
2008 Davit Bakradze 1,050,237 59.18
119 / 150
 Decrease 16 Steady 1st Government
2012 Vano Merabishvili 873,233 40.34
65 / 150
 Decrease 54 Decrease 2nd Opposition
2016 Davit Bakradze 477,143 27.11
27 / 150
 Decrease 38 Steady 2nd Opposition
2020 Mikhail Saakashvili[b] 523,127 27.18
30 / 150
 Increase 3 Steady 2nd Opposition

Presidential elections

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Election year Candidate 1st round 2nd round
# of overall votes % of overall vote # of overall votes % of overall vote
2004 Mikheil Saakashvili 1,692,728 96% (#1)
2008 Mikheil Saakashvili 1,060,042 53.73% (#1)
2013 David Bakradze 354,103 21.72% (#2)
2018 Grigol Vashadze 601,224 37.74% (#2) 780,680 40.48% (#2)

Local elections

[edit]
Election Votes % Seats +/–
2002
15 / 4,801
 New
2006 78.8
1,539 / 1,733
 Increase 1524
2010 1 119 641 65.75
1,492 / 1,738
 Decrease 47
2014 317 395 22.42
281 / 2,088
 Decrease 1211
2017 256 547 17.08
183 / 2,058
 Decrease 98
2021 541 188 30.67
509 / 2,068
 Increase 326

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ Natsebi serves as an abbreviation for the name "ნაციონალური მოძრაობა" (National Movement)
  2. ^ UNM nominated Saakashvili as a prime ministerial candidate

References

[edit]
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